

Eliot's masterpiece, "The Four Quartets," is, among other things, a kind of lens onto the war through spiritual eyes. After the remarkable turnaround at Dunkirk, when 350,000 soldiers were freed from nearly certain captivity, all eyes were on Winston Churchill, who was able to claim not victory, but temporary resistance against the dark powers in air and fire. Eliot, who had become English for all intents and purposes, declared that the best we can do is to "keep alive aspirations which can remain valid throughout the longest and darkest period of universal calamity and degradation" (101). Jacobs comments that the ethic undergirding this extraordinary poem is "homely": do your duty without grumbling in circumstances that are anything but propitious.

Auden gets as much attention as any of the five, perhaps because Jacobs has spent so much of his life studying him. His marvelous book, *What Became of Wystan: Change and Continuity in Auden's Poetry* (1998), showcases the author's skill in deciphering and then exhibiting the poet's artistry to the average reader. Auden wrote four long poems during the war years. One of them, "The Age of Anxiety," describes some of the psychological results of war, particularly the "displaced person." Intriguingly, the poem describes four New Yorkers, who, like Auden himself, have been spared the horrors of war, at least directly. One of the four, Rosetta, is Jewish and has escaped the harrowing realities of the Shoah. The best she can say about God is that somehow, despite all appearances, he is there. "His Question disqualifies our quick senses / His Truth makes our theories historical sins / It is where we are wounded that is when He speaks" After the war, the displaced persons are more qualified to address ultimate questions, though the answers may be elusive.

These brief words cannot adequately describe the remarkable cataract of insights in this book. They combine to form a real symphony of perceptions about the human need to defend *humanity* in a time of crisis. That may only be hoped for within a Christian framework.

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Elizabeth Agnew Cochran. *Protestant Virtue and Stoic Ethics*. London: T&T Clark, 2018.

With her latest work, Elizabeth Agnew Cochran continues her project of retrieving virtue for Protestant theological ethics. In particular, she argues that an ethic of constructive virtue emerges from the works of magisterial

Reformers like Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards when we consider the affinity that they have—not with *Aristotelian* and *Thomist* notions of virtue, but with *Stoic* virtue.

For the most part, Stoic virtue is overlooked within contemporary conversations on virtue because (1) Calvinism has often distanced itself from Stoicism to avoid charges of determinism, and (2) Alasdair MacIntyre and others have wrongly characterized Stoicism as noneudaimonist or ateleological. For Cochran, both of these are red herrings. In the first case, there is a documented influence of Roman Stoicism on the Reformers, especially Calvin. Thus, it makes sense that the two traditions would demonstrate affinity with each other. In the second case, recent studies of Roman Stoicism clearly demonstrate that Stoics are concerned with questions of human flourishing and teleology. For that reason, the Stoic tradition has more in common with Aristotelian accounts of practical reason and moral formation than MacIntyre suggests. Indeed, not only can Stoicism account for these things, it can go beyond Aristotelian accounts of virtue because it conceives of virtue in a nonlinear, or transformative, fashion. For this reason, it is uniquely suited to address Protestant commitments to the essential tenets of justification by faith alone and divine providence.

Cochran focuses her retrieval on the Roman Stoics (Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius) because, unlike the ancient and middle Stoics, the Romans are more interested in questions of practical reasoning and ethics. For the Roman Stoics, virtue is “a unified, singular, and transformative good” (55). First, virtue is unified because for the Stoics, to have virtue is to possess all of the virtues simultaneously. The “truly virtuous moral agent” possesses “practical intelligence” and is, therefore, able to act virtuous in any given circumstance (56). Second, virtue is singular because, unlike in Aristotelian thought, happiness is independent of external circumstances. The cultivation of virtue alone is sufficient for flourishing. Finally, virtue is transformative because the acquisition of Stoic virtue occurs instantaneously, not progressively through habituation. This instant acquisition occurs through transformation.

Virtue is exemplified in Roman Stoicism by the disposition of assent to divine providence. The person who accepts that the world is governed by a rational divine principle is the one who more readily accepts the external circumstances they confront. This acceptance, in turn, enables the virtuous person to focus on the internal circumstances that are within her power to change. Thus, for Stoicism, virtue means a person putting her trust in the basic moral order of the universe, living with a sense of gratitude for her place in the world, and developing within herself an impartial love for all people.

For Cochran, this basic account of Roman Stoicism demonstrates promising affinities with Protestant Christianity. In the first instance, Cochran argues that the Protestant emphasis on the centrality of faith is compatible with the Stoic concept of assent. Both faith and assent have cognitive and moral components. In each case, the agent must become aware of God's goodness and governance. Then, trusting in her newfound understanding, she acts in the world in accordance with God's goodness. This means that for Protestantism, faith, not love, is the central virtue of the Christian life.

A second important convergence between Protestant and Stoic thought concerns the question of moral transformation. Cochran argues that the Stoic insistence on the unity of virtue is compatible with the Protestant emphasis on justification by grace through faith alone. In particular, the sort of instantaneous transformation that Protestants attribute with conversion to faith is similar to the type of instant transformation that the Stoics describe when one goes from being vicious to being virtuous. In both instances, the instantaneous nature of the transformation can account for divine agency. Furthermore, this sort of account of moral transformation best describes the Christian experience of being transformed while remaining a sinner.

The similarities that Cochran draws out between Roman Stoicism and Protestant Christianity are undeniable; but even then, Cochran tempers our enthusiasm, reminding us that some fundamental differences remain. First, virtue is something that follows naturally in the Stoic account. For Christians, God's gracious action is the precondition for the Christian pursuit of virtue. Second, because Stoic virtue is instantaneous, there is no emphasis on moral formation after the transformation event. Christianity, on the other hand, is deeply concerned with questions of moral formation after conversion.

Overall, Cochran's argument is compelling. It should push the agenda to develop a Reformed virtue ethic forward by pressing questions about whether or not Reformed theology is that radical of a break with Thomist and Aristotelian moral thought. Recent studies of Reformed orthodoxy—especially on the question of natural law—seem to suggest otherwise. If there is one looming concern, it is the question of whether Protestant Christianity and Stoicism are commensurate with each other. Kevin Rowe has recently made the compelling case that they are rival traditions of moral inquiry (*One True Life* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016]). While Cochran addresses Rowe's argument, I do not think she really overcomes it. Her appeals to Jeffrey Stout's argument that all moral arguments are bricolage is anticipated by Rowe, who argues that this pragmatic account

of moral reasoning postpones the question of the truthfulness of either Christianity or Stoicism.

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Frances Luttikhuizen. *Underground Protestantism in Sixteenth Century Spain: A Much Ignored Side of Spanish History*. Refo500 Academic Studies 30. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016.

Dr. Frances Luttikhuizen's book, *Underground Protestantism in Sixteenth Century Spain: A Much Ignored Side of Spanish History* is a timely addition to the Reformation story. 2017 was the five-hundredth anniversary of the start of the Reformation, when on October 31, 1517, Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-Five Theses on the door on All Saints' Church in Wittenberg, Germany. History is important, and the document that Luther shared, meant only to be a topic for theological discussion among theologians, shows how events that seem unimportant at the time can change the world, as these theses that challenged the Roman Catholic Church were soon spread throughout Europe. Luttikhuizen's book records this dramatic historical change and how "new ideas" even made their way to Spain, where the Inquisition soon took action to quash any changes, so much so that "Lutheranism" became a catchphrase for any and all heresy. While this account is a dark story of the scandal and evil within the Roman Church during the Reformation era, it is a complete and honest presentation that needs to be integrated into the history of both Spain and the Christian church.

Luttikhuizen has offered a well-researched study of this era, which required the huge task of sorting through the Inquisition records, archives, and publications, much of it hidden until recently or not available in English. The author takes us from the glory days of Spain to the struggles of Charles V and Philip II to contain the growing influences of humanism and new theology; these efforts changed Spain from a tolerant, openly progressive power to an isolated peninsula dominated by dogmatic thugs. Luttikhuizen quotes on page 117 from Ernest Shafer's research that there were up to 2100 cases of persons who appeared before the Inquisition, of whom 220 were burned at the stake and 120 were burned in effigy. This book of 434 pages represents a herculean effort and offers a well-translated documentation of what took place over many generations in Spain and beyond.

This book is quite readable despite the complicated history of the Inquisition and its many victims, whom the author carefully highlights. It brings