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Paul Helm. *Human Nature from Calvin to Edwards*. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2018.

This book is a leisurely jaunt through theological anthropology. Paul Helm, beginning briefly with patristic and medieval sources, takes us through the Reformation thinkers up to Jonathan Edwards, outlining as he goes what he takes to be the distinctive features of these various authors' conceptualization of human nature. What is meant by "human nature"? Helm says, "We shall be interested in human nature as equivalent to the 'soul' in its metaphysics and its powers and capacities, including its relation to the body" (xii). Differences of opinion on how to understand the soul's properties and nature typically arose in light of theological discussions. What aspects of one's nature change in regeneration, exactly? What faculties of the mind are involved in saving faith? How does human freedom post-fall differ from human freedom pre-fall? And so on.

Being a gentleman of the Reformed persuasion, Helm's focus is on the Reformed tradition and the often-subtle debates that preoccupied that tradition's thinkers. Someone reading the volume to find out what Robert Bellarmine's take on this topic is will be disappointed.

Helm begins by pointing out that the thinkers in question all assume what is called "faculty psychology." He helpfully defines this concept as the view that the human self is composed of "different sets of powers, of faculties: the intellect, the emotions, and so on. ... Each set of powers is in relative independence of the others" (xvii). Thus, I might, in principle, lose my decision-making faculty, say, and be unable to intend anything, while retaining my faculty of emotion, and therefore remaining capable of feeling. The guiding thought behind faculty psychology is that each type of mental state or event is assigned its own distinct faculty in the soul.

So, what are the major positions taken on this topic? Helm begins by noting Aquinas's strong influence on the Reformed tradition (19). This influence is manifest in the dominance of intellectualism over voluntarism in Reformed thought. Like Aquinas, all Reformed thinkers took the understanding, the intellect, to be the faculty ultimately responsible for human action, not the will. Aquinas's Aristotelianism had far less influence on Reformed thought; however, although there were Aristotelians such as Vermigli about (ch. 2), it was the Platonism of Calvin that ended up the dominant influence.

Free will is a recurring theme throughout the book. The essential distinction between the Jesuit or Arminian freedom of indifference and the

Reformed preference for freedom of rational spontaneity is laid out with commentary from different theologians. Likewise, the introduction—which owes largely to Joseph Truman, it appears—of the celebrated distinction between natural and moral inability into Reformed thought is here discussed. Toward the end of the book, Helm picks up, to an extent, his debate with Richard Muller over whether Edwards’s theory of the will signaled a departure from the Reformed position.

One interesting perspective that Helm discusses is that of the “New Methodists.” They were a cluster of Reformed thinkers taking inspiration from John Cameron, who held to the curious view that freedom of indifference is a freedom fallen man has—a fitting consequence of the fall—while freedom of spontaneity—true freedom, they aver—is the freedom man returns to in his glorified state. I found encountering unusual and forgotten positions such as this to be the chief draw of the book.

Two things bothered me about the volume. The first was that I felt that Helm gave too little time to analysis and assessment of the various positions canvassed. In fairness, Helm makes it clear that, as far as he is concerned, “the emphasis is on straightforward didacticism, noting different emphases in different writers” (56). The second issue I had was the table of contents. It does not list sub-chapters. This makes it far harder than it should be to get a grasp of the particular debates and theologians treated in the various chapters of the book.

So egregious is this lack that I have appended to this review a more complete table of contents. This table should prove valuable to readers of the book.

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Jordan Peterson. *Twelve Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*. London: Allen Lane, 2018.

Jordan Peterson, a practicing clinical psychologist and a professor at the University of Toronto, has attained notoriety by speaking out against the social agendas promoted by minority identity groups. He considers them to be detrimental to the mental health of individuals and society, particularly when they pass into law. Drawing on his study of authoritarianism and thirty years’ experience in professional practice, he seeks to define the causes of the “chaos” or “poison” in present society.

Peterson sees human activity in terms of an antithesis between chaos and order, two fundamental aspects of lived experience. He analyzes the reasons for the present chaos then suggests ways they can be countered. He posits that ordering principles, standards, and values are needed from childhood to provide a framework for human flourishing. He explores the trends of postmodernism from the loss of belief systems to present group-centered dysphoria. The tyranny of ideas promoted by militant minorities herds